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I.  ARGUMENT 
 
1. OWNERS INCORRECTLY ASSERT THAT REVIEW OF THE 
ADMINISTRATIVE DECISION OBVIATES REVIEW OF THE 
TRIAL COURT DECISION.   
 
Both parties agree that this is an appeal of an adjudicatory proceeding, and 
that the decision of the land use authority is valid if supported by substantial 
evidence, and not otherwise arbitrary, capricious, or illegal.  Response Brief, p. 
19.  But, Owners contend that the City incorrectly applies the standard of review 
by attacking the order of the trial court, and that any error by the trial court is 
rendered “harmless” because this Court must review the City Council decision 
without according any deference to the trial court judgment.  Id. at 20.     
The City agrees that this Court need not accord the trial court decision any 
presumption of correctness.  See, Save our Canyons v. Board of Adjustment of Salt 
Lake County, 116 P.3d 978, 982-983 (Utah App. 2005).  With respect to the 
assertion that any error by the trial court was harmless in light of the standard of 
review, the Owners fail to cite any legal authority to support this dubious 
proposition.  Lack of deference to a trial court judgment does not mean that the 
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appellate court must ignore the trial court decision1.  The argument does not even 
make logical sense in that, if accepted, no appellate court in an appeal of 
administrative action could ever address erroneous rulings of law by a trial court.  
This appeal centers on a reversal on the merits of a municipal decision as land use 
authority.  The errors in this case were adopted by the trial court at the urging of 
the Owners.  This Court has jurisdiction to reverse any error of law in the 
proceeding subject to review.  See U.C.A. § 78A-4-103(1)(a)(jurisdiction to carry 
into effect all of the Court of Appeals’ judgments or orders).  Necessarily, this 
requires review of the trial court decision. 
2. ALL POINTS OF ERROR WERE PRESERVED FOR REVIEW. 
 
The City asserts four points of error.  Opening Brief, pp. 1-2.  In their 
Response Brief the Owners do not allege any failure to preserve these issues, 
stating instead that the issued are not subject to the preservation rule.  Response 
Brief, p. 2.  Accordingly, there is no dispute that all issues advanced by the City 
were preserved.  
 
                                                 
1 The Owners’ argument is a tacit admission that the trial court judgment is 
erroneous, though Owners characterize that decision as “harmless.” Response 
Brief, p. 20.   
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3. DENIAL OF THE PERMIT BASED ON THE INCONSISTENCY OF 
THE APPLICATION WITH THE MOAB GENERAL PLAN IS 
RATIONAL, AND CONSISTENT WITH THE LEGITIMATE LAND 
USE POWERS OF THE CITY. 
 
  The City contends that the denial of the conditional use permit in this case 
was rational and appropriate because the proposed use runs contrary to provisions 
in the City’s General Plan, which discourage the expansion of commercial uses in 
residential neighborhoods.  In response, the Owners assert that the General Plan is 
irrational, and beyond the legitimate powers of the City. Response Brief, p. 28.  
This argument was not presented to the City Council, and was therefore not 
preserved for review.  Pacific West Communities v. Grantsville City, 221 P.3d 
280, 286 (Utah App. 2009).  In any case, the argument does not hold up under 
scrutiny.  
a. Any Facial Challenge to the General Plan is Untimely.  
 
  Though the argument is not well defined, Owners appear to attack the 
content of the General Plan as unclear and “subjective” as to its terms.  Response 
Brief, pp. 33-34.  Owners rely upon Smith Inv. Co. v. Sandy City, 958 P.2d 245 
(Utah App. 1998), for the proposition that land use restrictions which are irrational 
violate the substantive component of the due process clause of the United States 
Constitution.  While this is a correct recitation of the law, Smith does not support 
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the Owners’ claims.   
Smith rejected a facial challenge to a rezoning ordinance which abolished a 
commercial use in a particular area.  To the extent that Owners rely on Smith to 
claim that the Moab General Plan is facially invalid, such a claim would be 
untimely.  See U.C.A. § 10-9a-801(5)(a challenge to the enactment of a general 
plan must be brought within 30 days of enactment); Tolman v. Logan City, 167 
P.3d 489, 492 (Utah App. 2007)(facial challenge to land use ordinance becomes 
ripe for review upon enactment).  Here, the General Plan was enacted in May, 
2002.  See R. 0646 (approval resolution accompanying the General Plan).  Any 
facial challenge is thus time-barred2. 
b. The General Plan Rationally Advances the Public Welfare. 
 
Second, to the extent that the Owners assert a due process challenge to the 
General Plan as applied to their land use application, the Plan easily withstands 
such a challenge because it represents a permissible policy choice within the range 
of choices that are reasonably debatable, as required for validity of a legislative 
enactment.  A municipal land use regulation does not violate the substantive 
                                                 
2 Similarly, the Moab conditional use permit ordinance has been on the books for 
many years.  See R. 0717; 0738 (Editor’s Notes showing dates of conditional use 
ordinance enactment).  Any facial challenge to the ordinance would also be time-
barred, though no such claim has apparently been advanced by the Owners. 
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component of due process unless it lacks a reasonable relation to the public health, 
safety, or general welfare.  Tolman v. Logan City, 167 P.2d at 495; citing: Smith 
Inv. Co. v. Sandy City, 985 P.2d at 252.  This Court previously recognized that the 
“exclusion of buildings devoted to business, trade, etc. from residential districts 
bears a rational relation to the health and safety of the community.”  Smith, at 254, 
citing: Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 391-393 (1926).  
Indeed, protecting children from business uses, promoting quiet residential areas, 
and the prevention of congestion, disorder, and traffic are all legitimate municipal 
objectives.  Id.  Zoning regulations which promote the integrity of a 
neighborhood and preserve its residential character are related to the general 
welfare and, therefore, a valid exercise of municipal authority.  Smith at 254-255; 
citations omitted. 
Here, the Moab General Plan explicitly favors protection of residential 
neighborhoods.  It announces a goal of promoting “..attractive, stable, and safe 
residential areas…”  R. 0621.  To “implement” that goal, the Plan provides that 
the City will “restrict commercial development in residential zones.”  Id.  The 
term “implementation” has meaning within the Plan, as that denotes 
“[r]ecommended courses of action to achieve goals in compliance with stated 
policies.”  R. 0610.  Thus, the General Plan includes both a proper subject for the 
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exercise of land use power—the protection of residential neighborhoods, and a 
reasonable and specific directive to achieve that goal—restricting the 
encroachment commercial uses in areas of zoned for residential development.   
Although the Owners contend that it is unknown what portion of the General 
Plan was relied upon by the Council in reaching its decision, Response Brief, p. 33, 
that statement is belied by the fact that one of the Council members specifically 
referred to this provision of the General Plan in the discussion immediately prior to 
the Council vote:  
“If you look at the general plan as it is right now, one of the five goals 
is to restrict commercial development in residential areas, or residential 
zones—sorry.  And in this specific instance in this zone, I feel like 
what we’re being asked to do is to force a commercial business on a 
residential area that clearly is not interested in creating a commercial 
zone.”  R. 0381.   
 
Thus, it is clear in the record that the Council took note of, and relied upon, the 
policies and implementation steps recommended in the General Plan, as shown at 
R. 0621.  These actions were entirely consistent with how the land use process is 
designed to work.  See Tolman, 167 P.3d at 495 (city acted properly by rezoning 
property in a manner consistent with objective in comprehensive plan of preserving 
single family housing).   
 In their brief Owners point to provisions of the General Plan that encourage 
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economic development within the City of Moab as contradicting the City’s 
decision that the application was inconsistent with the goals of the General Plan.  
Response Brief, p. 34.  This argument again misses the mark because Owners 
cannot point to provisions in the Plan that, for example, would encourage the 
expansion of lodging or commercial uses in residentially zoned areas.  In fact, the 
City of Moab has multiple zoning districts that are open to commercial 
development, while such development is constrained in other residential districts.  
The fact that the City encourages economic development generally does not mean 
that it is appropriate in every location, and the Plan agrees.       
Ultimately, Owners cite to multiple provisions in the General Plan that 
actually support the City’s decision.  Id. at 30 (General Plan notes that growth has 
increased land use conflicts; that long-range considerations should apply to land 
use decisions); p. 31 (noting a community vision that conflicting land uses are 
separated and buffered); p. 32 (noting a goal of minimizing impacts between 
transitions in land use); p. 33 (noting that the General Plan provides a basis for the 
rejection or modification of land use proposals that clearly conflict with the Plan’s 
goals). These provisions clearly buttress the Council decision which, at its core, 
rests on the notion that the City policies discourage uses which could create an 
unreasonable impact on residential neighborhoods.      
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c. A Municipality Acts Rationally When it Acts Consistent With its 
Comprehensive Plan. 
 
 Owners dismiss or attempt to distinguish the authorities cited by the City for 
the proposition that a conditional use permit may properly be denied due to lack of 
conformity with a comprehensive plan.  In doing so, Owners ignore that the City 
is required to have a comprehensive plan, per U.C.A. § 10-9a-401; that the plan is 
an advisory guide to land use decisions, the import of which may be varied by 
ordinance, U.C.A. § 10-9a-405; and that the City of Moab made compliance with 
the General Plan a mandatory condition for issuance of a conditional use permit.  
MMC § 17.09.530(H)(7); R. 0716.  Regardless, conformity of land use decisions 
with municipal comprehensive plans is a bedrock principal of land use law, in Utah 
and many other states.  See Tolman, supra; Krempasky v. Nez Perce County 
Planning and Zoning; 245 P.3d 983, 989(Idaho 2010)(county acted properly in 
granting conditional use permit where it found the use consistent with 
comprehensive plan); Baker v. City of Milwaukie, 533 P.2d 772 (Oregon 
1975)(variance granted in violation of comprehensive plan is unlawful); BBY 
Investors v. City of Maplewood, 467 N.W.2d 631, 634 (Minn. 1991)(city acted 
properly to deny conditional use permit where use was contrary to comprehensive 
plan and plan compliance was mandatory).  The weight of authority from this 
Court and others supports the conclusion that the City of Moab acted properly 
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here3.     
4. TESTIMONY FROM AFFECTED LANDOWNERS CANNOT BE 
DISMISSED AS MERE CLAMOR ABSENT SOME ELEMENT OF 
IMPROPER PURPOSE OR SERIOUS PROCEDURAL 
MISCONDUCT. 
 
 In their response the Owners essentially argue that the public opposition to 
their application must be dismissed as mere “clamor” and, in the absence of this 
clamor, their application must be approved under the ordinance.  They argue that 
there “is no record evidence to support the adverse public comment” of 
neighboring property owners.  Response Brief, p. 45.  Essentially, they argue that 
the testimony of neighboring property owners is incompetent, and must be 
excluded, unless confirmed by some other source.  In effect, Owners’ formulation 
of the public clamor concept argues for an exclusionary rule, one that collides 
squarely with constitutionally protected right of neighboring property owners to 
speak, and to petition local government for redress of grievances.   
A proper application of the “public clamor” doctrine requires that this Court 
enunciate a rule premised on respect for the rights of other parties to present 
evidence and arguments based on the substantive criteria of a land use ordinance.  
                                                 
3 Additionally, the fact that the Council relied upon the incompatibility of the 
application with the General Plan in reaching the decision rebuts the claim urged 
by the Owners that the decision was predicated solely on adverse public comment. 
 10 
 
Properly understood, the Council decision was appropriate in light of this standard. 
a. The Right to Petition the Government for Redress of Grievances 
is Fundamental. 
 
The First Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees to 
citizens the right to petition the government for redress of grievances.  Anderson 
Development Co. v. Tobias, 116 P.3d 323, 332 (Utah 2005)(dismissing tort claims 
brought against persons who objected to commercial development).  Under the so-
called Noerr-Pennington doctrine the United States Supreme Court has recognized 
that persons engaging in petitioning activity are protected from tort claims and 
other forms of retaliation resulting from efforts to influence officials and agencies 
of the government.  Id. (citations omitted).  Indeed, the right to petition and 
assemble for redress of grievances are among “the most precious of the liberties 
protected by the Bill of Rights.”  United Mine Workers America v. Illinois State 
Bar, 389 U.S. 217, 222 (1967).  And, the importance of the right to petition has 
been repeatedly recognized in the zoning context.  Protect our Mountain 
Environment v. District Court, 677 P.2d 1361, 1365-1366 (Colo. 1984)(identifying 
first amendment related zoning cases).   
Given the significance of the interests at stake, it follows that any judicial 
rule which has the effect of excluding whole classes of speech from public debate 
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based on the identity of the speaker or the content of his/her speech is inherently 
suspect.  See Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, 558 U.S. 310, 341 
(2010).  To the extent that the so-called public clamor doctrine operates to 
discount or exclude the testimony of neighboring property owners from zoning 
decisions, such a holding would run contrary to the First Amendment to the United 
States Constitution.   
b. Public Clamor as a Basis for Invalidating a Zoning Decision Has 
Always Been Founded on the Concept of Improper Purpose or 
Procedural Impropriety. 
 
Public clamor as a basis for invalidating a land use decision has always 
rested on an implicit finding that the decision was cover for a discriminatory 
purpose, or that the governmental entity was acting in a procedurally suspect 
manner.  For example, in Davis County v. Clearfield City, this Court noted a lack 
of any evidence to support the conditional use permit decision under review; that 
the city council engaged in secret closed-door meetings to discuss the application; 
and the near universal opposition to mental health treatment facilities as indicative 
of an improper purpose.  Davis County v. Clearfield City, 756 P.2d 704, 711-712 
(Utah App. 1988).  The Court also noted that the County essentially abdicated its 
role as an independent decision maker by asking for a show of hands from persons 
attending the public hearing to gauge public sentiment for and against the 
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application.  Id. at FN. 9.  The case involved both improper purpose and serious 
procedural defects.   
Likewise, in Uintah Mountain RTC, LLC v. Duchesne County, 127 P.3d 
1270 (Utah App. 2005) this Court again reviewed a conditional use permit for a 
mental health treatment facility and, relying on Davis County, again noted that the 
decision was motivated by fear of persons with mental health problems—an 
improper purpose.  Id. at 1277-1278.  In Uintah Mountain the court also found 
that the county had acted improperly in applying criteria, such as whether the 
facility was economically viable, that had no foundation in the zoning code.  Id. at 
1275    
Both Davis County and Uintah Mountain had an antecedent in City of 
Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432 (1985), another conditional use 
permit decision, this time involving a home for mentally handicapped persons.  In 
Cleburne the United States Supreme Court held that mere negative attitudes or fear 
of handicapped persons, unsubstantiated by factors which are properly cognizable 
in a zoning ordinance, are not permissible grounds for denying a permit for a 
handicapped group home.  Id. at 448.  By inquiring into the motivations of the 
decision maker the court determined that the land use decision was based on fear 
of the handicapped and, therefore, that it lacked a rational basis for decision.  Id. at 
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450.     
The guiding principal from these decisions is that a zoning decision is 
improper, and the result of public clamor, where the decision rests on  
discriminatory motives—prejudice against a disfavored group, which are unrelated 
to the factors in an ordinance that are the proper basis for a decision.  Improper 
public clamor is in reality a recognition of a decision based on pretext, rather than 
genuine zoning concerns.  Uintah Mountain RTC 127 P.3d at 1277 (decision is 
improper where the “real reason” for denial is public opposition).  Thus, the 
argument advanced by the Owners--that the City Council decision is deficient due 
to exclusive reliance upon public comment--misapplies the foregoing authorities, 
and fails to acknowledge the importance and constitutionally protected nature of 
that testimony. 
A proper formulation for the rule that public clamor invalidates a land use 
decision must be premised on a finding that the local government: a) acted with an 
improper purpose or motive unrelated to the legitimate purposes of the zoning 
ordinance; or b) engaged in serious procedural irregularities which compromised 
the fairness of the proceeding or its role as an independent decision maker.  This 
standard is entirely consistent with this Court’s prior holdings in Davis County and 
Uintah Mountain, and the Supreme Court’s holding in City of Cleburne.  And, the 
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standard avoids the defect inherent in a rule that precludes a local government from 
relying upon constitutionally protected speech.     
c. Under the Appropriate Formulation of the Concept of Public 
Clamor, the Moab Council Acted Properly to Weigh the Evidence 
Focused on the Criteria of the Ordinance. 
There is no evidence in this case that the Moab City Council decision is the 
product of discriminatory motive or procedural irregularity.  A bed and breakfast 
facility is a common commercial enterprise, and not the type of facility that 
typically provokes public outcry or prejudice.  Bed and breakfast lodging (and 
other lodging types) are permitted uses in several commercial zoning districts 
within the City of Moab.  See e.g. R. 0770, 0773, 0781 (Moab Municipal Code 
commercial zoning districts allowing bed and breakfast and lodging facilities).  
There is nothing in the record to suggest that the City acted as a result of personal 
animus or for reasons unrelated to the zoning code. 
Rather, the dispute here focuses on the criteria in the Moab ordinance, and 
the conclusion that this use is not the right fit for the site.  The rules for bed and 
breakfast uses in residential areas are strict in that an applicant must show “clearly 
minimal negative impacts on adjacent residential properties and neighborhoods.”  
MMC § 17.09.531(9)(A)(1); R. 0722.  Similarly, the general rules for conditional 
uses require that the applicant show that the use is compatible with adjacent 
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existing uses, and that it does not pose unreasonable impacts in terms of such 
things as noise, traffic, parking, or the like.  MMC § 17.09.530(H); R. 0715 
(approval conditions).  All of these requirements, which focus on promoting 
harmony between land uses and avoiding harm to existing uses, are legitimate 
subjects for the exercise of municipal zoning power.  It is not surprising that an 
application may fail to meet this exacting standard due to site constraints.    
 Moreover, the public testimony in opposition to the application was, for the 
most part, focused on these approval criteria.  For example, neighbors provided 
substantive comments referring to the criteria in the ordinance and noting impacts 
about the lack of parking, a projected 38% increase in traffic, and vehicle noise 
levels in excess of 80 decibels4.  R. 0216-0219 (written comments addressed to 
criteria in ordinance); 0353-0357 (testimony about noise levels and street grades)5.  
Others testified to qualitative changes to the neighborhood and its traffic patterns 
that would result from a new commercial use.  R. 0241-0242.  The testimony 
offered specifics, including the observation that the use of Off Highway Vehicles, 
                                                 
4 The Owners failed to offer any traffic study to rebut these concerns.   
5 Several neighbors commented on the reference in design drawings to “trailer and 
secondary vehicle parking” and observed that the Owners might market their 
facility to off highway vehicle enthusiasts, who would create additional impacts in 
terms of noise, pollution, speed, pedestrian safety, and the like. R. 0220; 0252; 
0242 
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a common recreational activity in Moab, would likely occur at the new 
development and result in noise emissions of between 75-80 decibels, a figure 
which exceeds the Moab noise ordinance. R. 0218.  The Record is replete with 
genuine, substantive concerns about the compatibility of the proposed use with the 
existing qualities of the neighborhood.  See Appellants’ Opening Brief, Statement 
of Facts, pp. 4-9.   
While there were admittedly some neighbor comments that amounted to 
unsupported opinion, these comments were more than overcome by testimony 
from others that was focused on the criteria in the ordinance, and based on personal 
observation of the neighborhood.  The City, as land use authority, properly 
weighed this testimony and concluded that the Owners had not met their burden of 
proof.  As the finder of fact, the Council had the duty to weigh this conflicting 
evidence to determine if the Owners had satisfied the requirements of the 
ordinance6.  It is not this Court’s prerogative to weigh the evidence anew.  Save 
our Canyons v. Board of Adjustment of Salt Lake County, 116 P.3d at 983 
(standard of review in appeal of adjudicative proceeding).  Instead, looking at the 
                                                 
6 This was not a case of the local government blindly acceding to demands by the 
public.  The vote was 3-1 to deny the application, with one Council member 
voting in favor, and another noting that the decision was a difficult call for her.  R. 
0371-0380; 0382-0383. 
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evidence on both sides, this Court should conclude that the decision was rational 
and based on a reasonable evaluation of the evidence.    
5. THE OWNERS CONCEDE THAT THE TRIAL COURT 
MISAPPLIED THE STANDARD OF REVIEW AND THAT IT 
IMPROPERLY ADDRESSED THE SUBJECT OF A REMAND FOR 
FINDINGS. 
 
 The City brought two points of error which were not addressed by Owners in 
their response brief: a) that the trial court erred in failing to order a remand for 
additional findings; and b) that the court incorrectly applied the standard of review 
by engaging in its own fact-finding and shifting the burden of proof to the City.  
Opening Brief, pp. 23-26.  Appellate courts have discretion to disregard the 
position of an appellee where it fails to directly address in its brief the arguments 
brought on appeal.  Broderick v. Apartment Management Consultants, 279 P.3d 
391, 393-394 (Utah 2012).  Here, the Owners have essentially conceded points of 
error number three and four brought by the City.  Opening Brief, pp. 1-2.  
Accordingly, this Court has discretion to accept the proffered arguments of the 
City on those points.  Broderick, 279 P.3d at 396. 
II. CONCLUSION 
 
 The City of Moab respectfully requests that the judgment of the trial court be 
reversed and that the conditional use permit that is the subject of this appeal be 
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deemed void.  The City additionally requests an award of its costs in this action to 
the extent permitted by law.  
III.  REQUEST FOR ORAL ARGUMENT 
The City of Moab hereby requests oral argument in this appeal.   
 
Submitted this 6th day of September, 2016. 
 
DUFFORD, WALDECK, MILBURN  
& KROHN, LLP      
 
By:  /s/ Christopher G. McAnany   
Christopher G. McAnany, #7933  
Attorneys for Appellants 
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